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Picketing of Private Homes:
The Anomalous Peaceful Picketing Clause
WARREN K. WiNKLER*
On the 18th of September, 1962, striking employees of the A. R.
Clarke Company of Toronto were found guilty of the offence of
watching and besetting. The city newspapers reported that Magistrate
Graham had convicted two strikers, Donnelly and Brierly, because
they peacefully picketed the homes of other employees of the com-
pany who refused to stop work when the strike was called.1
The public policy salient in both federal and provincial labour
legislation has been to foster stability in labour relations through
collective bargaining.2 Striking has been described as a continuation
of collective bargaining 3 and is a common law right which the Courts
will protect.4 Peaceful picketing is the most familiar trademark of
any strike, probably because the picket line is thought to serve such
a variety of purposes. The picket line animates the quarrel and
makes the strike more effective; the picket line communicates the
information of the dispute to the rest of the community;5 the picket
line enlists the support of independent parties6 and serves to identify
people for the purposes of both the employer and the strikers; the
picket line very often simply intimidates. In pursuance of all these
* Mr. Winkler is a post-graduate student at Osgoode Hall Law School.
I Toronto Globe and Mail, Toronto Telegram, Toronto Daily Star, Sept
19, 1962; Reg. v. Donnelly and Brierly, an unreported decision of Magistrate
Graham.
2 Oil Workers International Union, C.I.O.-C.C.L., Port Credit, Local 610
and Trinidad Leaseholds (Canada) Ltd., and International Union of Operat-
ing Engineers, Local 796, (1949-54) C.C.H. L.L.R. P. 17,005 (O.L.R.B.). See
also Woods and Ostry, Labour Policy and Labour Economics in Canada(1962), c. iv; (19601 1 Ont. Leg. Ass. Deb. at p. 695. For the American
position see Newman, The Law of Labour Relations (1953), pp. 112.3 Reynolds, Labour Economics and Labour Relations (3rd ed. 1960),
at p. 279.
4 Regina v. Canadian Pacific Railway Co. (1962), 31 D.L.R. (2d) 209.
aff'd. (1962), 33 D.L.R. (2d) 30 (Ont. CA.).
5 Finkelman, The Law of Picketing in Canada, (1937-38), 2 Univ. Toronto
L.J. 67 at p. 69. See also Armour, Picketing, 57 C.C.C. 1 at p. 14. See also
Tanenhaus, Picketing as Free Speech: Early Stages in the Growth of the
New Law of Picketing, 14 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 397 (1952-53) at p. 417-18.
6 Carrothers, Recent Developments in the Tort Law of Picketing, (1957),
35 Can. Bar Rev. at p. 1005.
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good, bad and doubtful objectives, picketing may be either lawful 7
or unlawful, depending upon its form, object or result.8
In any discussion of legal policy one must always be cognizant
of underlying social issues. A visit to the cellars of the law to
examine the foundations of the criminal implications of picketing
seems timely especially in view of the fact that a quarter of a
century has now passed since the appearance of Professor Finkelman's
exhaustive dissertation on this subject.9 During that time not only
has the social milieu been recast but several significant legal land-
marks have been passed which must now be taken into consideration.
Modelled after the English Conspiracy and Protection of Property
Act' 0 the Canadian Criminal Code provides in section 366:1
(1) Every one who, wrongfully and without lawful authority, for the
purpose of compelling another person to abstain from doing anything
that he has a lawful right to do, or to do anything that he has a
lawful right to abstain from doing,...
(f) besets or watches the dwelling house or place where that person
resides, works, carries on business, or happens to be, . . .
is guilty of an offence punishable on summary conviction.
(2) A person who attends at or near or approaches a dwelling house or
place, for the purpose only of obtaining or communicating informa-
tion, does not watch or beset within the meaning of this section.
The words "watch and beset" have been taken by the Courts
to define picketing' 2 or at least are understood to include picketing.
Picketing is a problem of social significance and has been analogized
to free speech or the liberty of self-expression. As such, it may be
7 General Dry Batteries of Canada Ltd. v. Brigenshaw et al., [1951]
4 D.L.R. 414 (Ont. M-C.); Aristocratic Restaurants (1947) Ltd. v. Williams
et al., [1951], S.C.R. 762, 3 D.L.R. 769 (S.C.C.); Mostrenko v. Groves (1953),
10 W.W.R. (N.S.) 519; Grinnell Company of Canada 'v. Retail Wholesale
and Department Store Union Local 535 et al. (1956), 18 W.W.R. 263 (B.C.C.A.)
Hersees of Woodstock Ltd. v. Goldstein et al., [1963] 1 O.R. 36 (Ont. H.C.),
rev'd. (Ont. C.A.) Feb. 26, 1963, unreported Mar. 15, 1963, Union Nationale
des Employes de Vickers v. Canadian Vickers Ltd., (1955-59) C.C.H. L.L.R. P.
15,187 (Que. Q.B.); Borek v. Amalgamated Meat Cutters and Butcher Work-
men of North America, Local 311, et al., (1955-59) C.C.HL L.L.R. P. 15,106 (Que.
Sup. Ct.); A..G. B.C. v. Ellsay et al. (1959), 19 D.L.R. (2d) 453.
s Supra, footnote 6.
9 Supra, footnote 5.
10 38 and 39 Vict., c. 86 (1875).
11 S.C. 1953-54, c. 51, s. 366. The section was first enacted in S.C. 1876,
c. 37, s. 2. In 1892 the criminal law was consolidated in the Criminal Code
and the peaceful picketing proviso (now 366(2)) omitted: S.C. 1892, c. 29,
s. 523. At the instance of Canadian labour the clause was restored by
S.C. 1934, c. 47, s. 12.
12 Rex. v. Doherty and Stewart, 86 C.C.C. 286 at p. 295; Aristocratic
Restaurants, supra, footnote 7 at p. 786.
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protected by the Bill of RightsI3 as a civil liberty. However, the
two recent cases of Regina v. Gonzales'4 and Koss v. Kohn'5 held that
a general act such as the Bill of Rights cannot and was never intended
to repeal a specific enactment without saying so expressly. Freedom
of speech cannot be spoken of 'simpliciter'; it cannot be unlimited
because the interests of the community require that some limitations
be placed upon it.16 It is in this light that the section of the Code
must be read.
Where the picketing of private homes occurs there are definite
conflicts of social interests. Should the rights of the individual
to the peaceful enjoyment of his residence give way to the right
of workmen to picket? Which liberty is to take precedence over
the other;17 a problem most clearly raised where domestic employees
are involved?' 8 Is there such thing as the 'sanctity of the home'?' 9
The subject matter to which section 366 must be applied lends
itself to a highly emotional interpretation of the Act. Oliver Wendell
Holmes Jr. once commented:
3 Canadian Bill of Rights, S.C. 1960, c. 44, s. 1(d). In the United States
picketing has been equated with freedom of speech and held to be protected
by the Amendments to the Constitution. See Tanenhaus, supra, footnote 5,
and Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940) at p. 104; International Brother-
hood of Teamsters etc. v. Vogt. 354 U.S. 284 (1957); Fruit and Vegetable
Packers and Warehousemen, Local 760, etc., v. N.L.R.B., 308 F. 2nd 311(1962). There is a distinction between "free speech picketing" and "more than
free speech picketing." In the case of Zeeman v. Amalgamated Retail and
Department Store Employees' Union, 18 U.S.L. Week 2375 (Cal. Sup. Ct.
Feb. 1, 1950), the picketing of a residence was held to be permissible as an
exercise of the right to "free speech."
See also the Saskatchewan case of Reg. v. Vogelgesang, (1955-59) C.C.H.
L.L.R. P. 15,141 in which a police magistrate held that the Saskatchewan
Bill of Rights, which guaranteed freedom of expression, took precedence
over a municipal by-law prohibiting the distribution of handbills which was
being done in this case, by strikers picketing a store.
14 (1962), 132 C.C.C. 237 (B.C.C.A.) at p. 239.
15 (1961), 36 W.W.R. 100 (B.C.C.A.).
16See the remarks of Justice Black for a summary of the opposite
approach to this which is taken in the United States: Justice Black and
First Amendment "Absolute": A Public Interview, 37 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 549(1962). at pp. 553-57. He feels that the rights guaranteed by the Amend-
ments to the American Constitution, i.e., freedom of speech, are absolute
and cannot be abridged. However, this is a literal interpretation of the
words used in the Amendment See also People v. Mago, 38 Labor Cases
65, 835 (1959). Compare the Fruit and Vegetable Packers case, supra,
footnote 13.1 7 State v. Cooper, 285 N.W. 903 (Minn., 1939).
18 Strikes and Boycotts-Picketing Private Residence, 24 Minn. L. Rev.
132 at pp. 133-34. See also Barry, A Union May Peacefully Picket the Home
of an Employer with whom it has a Labour Dispute, 38 Geo. L.J. at pp.
687-689. The Ontario Labour Relations Act does not apply to domestic
employees. R.S.O. 1960, c. 202, s. 2(a).
'
9 People v. Levner, 30 N.Y.S. 2d, 487 (Mag. Ct. City of N.Y., 1941) at
p. 493. "In view of current trends and decisions, this court is not at this
time prepared to state that picketing a home is, in and of itself, disorderly
conduct. . . . We do not possess the same fervent championship of the
right of domestic privacy that pertains in England. . . ." [referring to
English Trade Disputes Act, 17 and 18 Geo. 5, c. 22 (1927) repealed by 9-10-11
Geo. 6, c. 52, s. 1.
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The danger is that such considerations should have their weight In an
articulate form as unconscious prejudice or half conscious inclination.
To measure them justly needs not only the highest powers of a judge
and a training which the practice of the law does not insure, but also a
freedom from prepossessions which is very hard to attain .... The time
has gone by when law is only an unconscious embodiment of the common
will. It has become a conscious reaction upon itself of organized society
knowingly seeling to determine its own destinies.20
It must be kept in mind that this is a criminal statute with
criminal sanctions and that anyone found guilty bears the stigma
of a criminal conviction. The standard of proof to be used Is that
used in all criminal cases, proof beyond a reasonable doubt, or
(where circumstantial evidence is used) proof that the circumstances
are inconsistent with any conclusion other than guilt.21 Each require-
ment of the section must be proven according to this standard.
Finally, there is a presumption in favour of the liberty of the
individual.2 The interpretation and application of section 366 must
therefore be analytical if the intention of Parliament is to be borne
out and justice done.
An Analysis of Section 366
Section 366 provides, in essence, that any person who does any
of the enumerated acts, wrongfully and without lawful authority,
with a view to compel someone to do something that he has a right
to do or refrain from doing will be punished. A qualifying proviso
is appended which exonerates anyone who attends in close proximity
to a dwelling house or place for the purpose only of obtaining or
communicating information. Thus the prosecution must prove be-
yond a reasonable doubt that the act complained of
(1) was "wrongful and without lawful authority";
(2) was done with a "view to compel"; and
(3) amounted to "watching and besetting."
It has been held that the introductory words, ... wrongfully
and without lawful authority with a view to compel.. ." constitute
the offence and that the enumerations are only means by which the
offence may be committed.23 The enumeration of particular acts
would appear to exhaust the ways in which the offence can be com-
mitted.24
(a) Wrongfully and without lawful authority
The interpretation of these words, perhaps the most significant
in the section, have resulted in a bifurcation of judicial opinion. On
2011olmes, Privilege, Malice and Intent, 8 Harv. L. Rev. 1 (1894-95)
at p.,9.
Bt~eg. v. Branscombe, (1956J O.W.N. 897 (Ont. C.A.) at p. 898.22 Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes (11th ed. 1962), at p. 275.2 3 The State (at the prosecution of John Oharles Hardy) v. Distriot
Justice Cathal O'Flynn, [19481 Ir. R. 343.2 4 Maxwell, supra, footnote 22, at pp. 264-75. Moulton, L.J. in the Ward,
Lock case, supra, footnote 20 at p. 329 stated: "The classes of acts are
set out in the five several subsections, each of which must, of course, be
read with the opening words of the section."
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the one hand there are cases which indicate that the words are
redundant and meaningless; that they are inserted in criminal statutes
as a matter of course and not out of necessity. The countervailing
authorities would require strict proof that the act complained of
was wrongful or without lawful authority. They would require that
the picketing be illegal, criminal, tortious, or at least constitute a
civil nuisance. In the case of Lyons v. Wilkins, Lindley, M.R. said:-
It is not necessary to show the illegality of the overt acts complained of
by other evidence than that which proves the acts themselves, if no
justification or excuse for them is reasonably consistent with the facts
proved. This is the principle always applied in criminal prosecutions
in which the words2 'feloniously' 'wrongfully,' or 'maliciously' are
introduced into the charge, and have to be proved before the person
accused can be properly convicted: see Archbold's Criminal Pleading
and Evidence, 19th ed. pp. 64-7.25
Less than ten years later, sitting in a court of co-ordinate juris-
diction in the case of Ward, Lock and Company (Limited) v. Opera-
tive Printers' Assistants' Society, Vaughan Williams, L.J. stated
that the words in the first clause of the section, "wrongfully and
without legal authority" were introduced for the very purpose of
limiting criminal prosecution to cases so tortious as to create a
civil cause of action. The summons before the magistrate and the
punishment on conviction were enacted by way of an additional remedy
to the civil remedy already existing.26
Moulton, L.J., in referring to the judgment of Lindley, M.R. in
the Lyons case, pointed up the distinction between these two judg-
ments very succinctly when he said:
But he arrives at it in a different way. He construes the word 'comper
in the opening words of the section in such a sense as to make the act
of compelling wrongful in itself, and therefore considers the presence of
the word 'wrongfully' as superfluous, or at least as only an indication of
the phraseology to be used by the pleader. I see no reason why we should
treat so lightly a word of such importance.27
Professor Finkelman suggests four grounds upon which the
Ward, Lock view should prevail: 28
(a) Vaughan Williams, L.J. had concurred reluctantly in the
Lyons case, and did so only because he considered himself bound
by authority. In Ward, Lock, with the approval of his brothers, he
asserted the views which he regarded as correct.
(b) Lindley, M.R. had concluded that all watching and besetting
constituted a common law nuisance; the saving clause would then
become meaningless for it does not authorize the commission of
a nuisance. Thus, although picketers could not be prosecuted under
this section, nevertheless in every instance they could still be
proceeded against at common law for committing a nuisance, a
conclusion contrary to the intention of the Legislature and the
25 [1899J 1 Ch. 255 at p. 267. Chitty, LJ. agreed at p. 272.
26 (1906), 22 T.L.R 327 at p. 329. Moulton, L.J. concurred at p. 329.
27 Id.2S Sup'ra, footnote 5 at pp. 8&91.
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opinion of various judges that picketing to obtain and communicate
information is permissible. He continues by saying that on the
other hand it could be argued that an equally absurd result would
flow from an unqualified acceptance of the principle, suggested by
Moulton, L.J. in the Ward, Lock case. For if the watching and be-
setting to be criminal must at least be a common law wrong, the
proviso permitting attendance for the purpose of communicating
information would be meaningless unless it justified or excused the
commission of such a wrong. Professor Finkelman concludes that,
however, the absurdity does not arise, because, where the watching
and besetting, although it constitutes a civil wrong, is merely for
the purpose of obtaining and communicating information, the parties
are left to their civil remedies and the complainants are not given
the additional protection of the criminal law. Finally, it may be
that the proviso was added as a precautionary afterthought to prevent
hostile magistrates from holding every form of watching and be-
setting an unlawful act.
(c) The cases may be distinguished on the facts. The picketers
committed a nuisance in the Lyons case; they did not in the Ward,
Lock case.
(d) The English Court of Appeal (which decided both Ward,
Lock and Lyons) approved the Ward, Look decision in the case of
Fowler v. Kibble.29
Strangely, the Courts have not yet recognized the danger in-
herent in the Lyons decision. The effect of the decision is actually
to shift the onus of proof onto the defence to establish that the
watching and besetting is lawful. In the absence of such proof the
watching and besetting is presumed to be wrongful and without
lawful authority. Lindley, M.R. in the Lyons case stated:
The truth is that to watch or beset a man's house with a view to compel
him to do or not to do what is lawful for him to do or not to do Is
wrongful and without lawful authority unless some reasonable justifica-
tion for it is consistent with the evidence. Such conduct seriously Inter-feres with the ordinary comfort of human existence and ordinary enjoy-
ment of the house beset, and such conduct would support an action
on the case for nuisance at common law: ... 30
Chitty, L.J. explained the problem in these words:
The acts mentioned in the five sub-sections being in themselves unlawful,
the words 'wrongfully and without legal authority' are Inserted to
provide for any unforeseen case in which the evidence of the overt acts
may possibly shew some lawful excuse or justification (as 'authority'
is said to cover 'excuse' ... lawful authority or justification).31
Vaughan Williams, L.J. in the same case, disagreed saying:
- .. 'wrongfully and without legal authority' mean unwarranted by law,
which in an indictment for nuisance is ordinarily expressed by the word
'injuriously'.... This is a different thing from holding the words 'wrong-
fully and without legal authority' to mean without lawful excuse, which
would shift the onus from the prosecution to the defence.32 [Italics added.]
29 [1922] 1 Ch. 487.30 Supra, footnote 25 at p. 267.
31Id., at p. 272.
32 Id., at p. 273.
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Moulton, L.J. in the Ward, Lock case would appear to have been
thinking on a similar plane to Vaughan Williams, L.J. when he
concluded at page 330:
S.. but in my view that which decides the question is that there is no
evidence of any improper or illegal acts .... 33
On the other hand, it is a principle of the criminal law that
where the word 'wrongful' is included in a statute it need not be
proven as a limb of the offence. 34 Proof of the conduct complained
of in the statute is sufficient proof of wrongfulness. The primary
burden of proof rests on the Crown unless the statute clearly shifts
it to the defence. The secondary burden of proof, that of adducing
evidence, is shifted to the defence, there being a rebuttable pre-
sumption that the conduct was wrongful. However, the accused
person need not introduce any evidence to disprove the wrongful-
ness, that is, upon failing to do so the issue will not be automatically
concluded against him. If, at the close of the Crown's case, there is
a remote possibility that the conduct was not wrongful, the Crown
will not have satisfied the primary burden. In practice this is not
such a significant advantage, as it would appear to be incumbent
upon the defence to introduce evidence which may cast doubt upon
the wrongfulness of the conduct.35
The Canadian cases prior to 1938 (the date of Professor Finkel-
man's article) pay little attention to the differences in approach
set forth in the two cases previously discussed.3 6 However, in the
case of Rex v. Reners37 Harvey, C.J.A. held that the Lyons case
was to be followed.33 Clarke, J.A. (dissenting) followed the Ward,
Lock definition of "wrongully and without legal authority" taking
care to point out that in the Fowler case,39 which followed Ward,
Lock, the Lyons decision had been brought to the attention of the
Court.40 This dissenting judgment in the Court of Appeal set the
stage for an authoritative statement by the Supreme Court of
Canada on the meaning to be given the words. However, in the
Supreme Court, Newcombe, J. speaking for the majority, found the
picketing in question to constitute a nuisance and thus the application
of either case would bring about the same result. He stated:
The judgments concur in the view that watching or besetting, if carried
on in a manner to create a nuisance, is at common law wrongful and
without legal authority.4'
3 3 Supra, footnote 26.34 Supra, footnote 25.35 Beg. v. Sharpe, [1962] O.W.N. 261 (Ont. C.A.).36 See Finkelman, supra, footnote 5, at p. 91 footnote 113.
37 [1926] 2 D.L.R. 236 (Alta. C.A.). aff'd. [1926] SC.R. 499 (S.C.C.).38 The reasons are critically analysed by Finkelman, supra, footnote 5,
at pp. 92-94.39 Supra, footnote 29.40 Supra, footnote 37 at p. 244.
41 Id., (S.C.C.) at p. 506.
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There is little discussion by the Court as to the essential
difference between the two cases it being unnecessary for the deci-
sion. Idington, J. concurred in the result but differed in his reasoning,
accepting the Lyons case as the authority to be followed.42 The
cases decided in England, with the exception of Lyons, he considered
to be of little assistance in Canada in view of the deletion of the
peaceful picketing proviso from the Canadian statutes (taken out
in 1892 and inserted again in 1934).43 Stating that watching and
besetting ". . . always was at common law wrongful, and might be
the basis of a civil action, and hence clearly wrongful," 44 and since
Lyons had been adopted as the law in Manitoba and Alberta4 5 and
more especially since the proviso had been removed, he thought
Lyons to be good law.46
Professor Finkelman asks, firstly, why all of the English cases
since the omission of the proviso from the criminal code, except
Lyons, are rejected as authority when they are all decisions on the
same statute-the Conspiracy and Protection of Property Act, 1875.
Furthermore, he argues, the proviso, on a literal reading of the
section, modifies watching and besetting and not wrongfully and
without lawful authority. He concludes that the decisions on the
latter phrase, whether English or Canadian, are worthy of considera-
tion in Canada. 47
The law was discussed once again in the Supreme Court of
Canada in the case of Williams et al. v. Aristocratic Restaurants
(1947) Ltd.48 This was a civil case involving the peaceful picketing
of certain business premises by two picketers and in which the
Court found the picketers not liable. Kerwin, J. in discussing the
criminal law stated:
It was said... [in the] Reners case, that the judgments in the Ward,
Lock case and the Lyons case concur in the view that watching or
besetting, if carried on in a manner to create a nuisance, is at common
law wrongful and without legal authority. Picketing is a form of
watching and besetting but that still leaves for decision, in each case,
what amounts to a nuisance. Whatever might have been held some
years ago, in these days the actions of the appellants did not constitute
a nuisance.49 [Italics added].
This appears to have been exactly the position taken in the Ward,
Look case; in the absence of proof of civil nuisance the picketing
is not wrongful and therefore there is no offence.
Rand, 3. discussed both cases but decided the issue by applying
the peaceful picketing proviso.5 0 Kellock, J. evaluated the cases,
42 Id., at p. 514.4 3 Supra, footnote 11.
44 Id., at p. 511.45 Id., at p. 513.
46 Id., at p. 514.
4 7 Supra, footnote 7.
48 Id.
4 9 Id., at p. 786.
50 Id., at p. 789.
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recognized the disagreement between Ward, Lock and the Lyons
case, but did nothing to clarify the situation.
Since 1938, the cases, civil and criminal, have generally fol-
lowed the Ward, Lock case requiring proof of tortious conduct to
satisfy the condition of "wrongfully and without lawful authority"
but there has been no express disapproval of the Lyons case.51 When
all of the arguments are marshaled it would appear that the Ward,
Lock decision should govern the interpretation of this troublesome
phrase. There is a definite need for an authoritative decision cate-
gorically stating the position that Canadian courts may be expected
to take in this matter.
(b) With a view to compel
In order to have committed an offence under section 366 the
accused person must have picketed with a "view to compel." It is
incumbent upon the prosecution to prove this beyond a reasonable
doubt. It has been held that "view" means purpose and not motive,52
but this distinction is not altogether clear. However, it is not essential
to prove that the purpose of the accused had been effected.53
The compulsion may be directed against the employer in order
to cause him to comply with the demands of the strikers. It may
also be directed toward a prospective employee for the purpose of
forcing him to sell his labour elsewhere or against an individual
member of the public, a prospective customer, with the intention
of effecting the "struck" employer indirectly.54 The compulsion need
not be physical in nature,5 5 but it implies a coercive purpose.56 Rand,
J. in the Aristocratic case decided that compulsion may be brought
about by persuasion:
51 Canada Dairies Ltd. v. Seggie, 74 C.C.C. 210 at p. 219; Rubenstein v.
Kumer et al., 73 C.C.C. 334 (Ont. H.C.); Wasserman v. Sopman, 77 C.C.C.
334; Rex v. Doherty and Stewart, 86 C.C.C. 286 at p. 293; Smith Brothers
Construction Co. Ltd. v. Jones et al., [1955] O.R. 362; General Dry Batteries
of Canada Ltd. v. Brigenshaw et al., [1951] 4 D.L.R. 414 at p. 418 (Ont.
H.C.); Rex v. Bonhomme, 86 C.C.C. 100. However, the issue is far from
settled-see Poole and Poole v. Ragen and Toronto Harbour Commissioners,[1958] O.W.N. 77; Southam Co. Ltd. v. Gouthro et al., [1948] 3 D.L.R. 178(B.C.S.C.) at pp. 190-91 per Wilson J.: "Of these provisions it may be said
that the offences described in s. 501 (now s. 366) were offences and torts at
common law (C.F. judgment of Fletcher Moulton L.J. in Ward, Lock & Co.
v. Operative Printers' Assistants' Soo., supra) . . . the presence of such
unreasonable numbers of persons, crowding the sidewalks, blocking the
entrances to the building, cannot be justified under . . . s. 501 of the
Code... ."; see also Hersees case, supra, footnote 7, per Aylesworth, J.A. at
p. 14.
52 Lyons v. Wilkins, supra, footnote 25 at p. 270.
53 Rex v. Doherty and Stewart, supra, footnote 51 at p. 291.
54L jons v. Wilkins, supra, footnote 25 at p. 270 and pp. 272-3 and
Aristocratic Restaurants, supra, footnote 7 at p. 788.
55 Canada Dairies Ltd. v. Seggie, supra, footnote 51 at pp. 218-19.
56 Aristocratic Restaurants, supra, footnote 7 at p. 788.
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If the meaning is that the compulsion cannot be brought about by per-
suasion, I confess I am equally unable to follow the reasoning. For
what conceivable use or purpose would information be furnished if not
to win support by the persuasive force of the matter exhibited? The
persuasion is not ordinarily or necessarily sought of the person to be
compelled; economic pressure is to affect him; but that pressure, quite
legitimate by those who exert it, may easily be set in motion by per-
suasion exercised upon either workmen or the public is a frequent ex-
perience of labour controversy.57
Coercion may be of a moral, social or economic nature. For
the purposes of the Act moral coercion will suffice, 58 and it has
recently been indicated that social coercion is also sufficient. 59 Econo-
mic coercion is clearly prohibited according to Mr. Justice Rand in
his statement above. It must be remembered that social and moral
coercion are both designed to bring economic pressure to bear on
the "struck" employer indirectly. Professor Finkelman agrees that
the compulsion need not be an accomplished fact but states that
where peaceful picketing has been considered, judges have been overly
anxious to find compulsion. He suggests that in doing so the courts
in effect declare that all persuasion amounts to compulsion.60
Fortunately, the Legislature foresaw the possibility of such
an interpretation and in the case of picketing provided two safe-
guards. Picketing carried out with the object of compelling must be
(a) wrongful and without lawful authority and (b) must not be
excluded by the proviso. As Moulton, L.J. said in the Ward, Lockc
case:-
In my opinion, the Legislature inserted the word 'wrongfully' expressly,
because it did not intend to leave this all-important limitation of the
ambit of the clause to the chance that a Court might construe the
word 'compel' in such a restricted sense. And the course of the argu-
ments in the present case convince me that the Legislature was prudent
in so doing.61
Of course the proper interpretation must be given to the two pro-
tective phrases. Moulton, L.J. went on to say that since not all
compulsion is undesirable, or perhaps even the converse of this, his
suggested interpretation of "wrongfully" was essential.
As a general rule, purpose is proven by indirect evidence. Out
of necessity resort must be had to the surrounding circumstances
and the purpose of compulsion inferred from the circumstances in
each case. Although the evidence used may be circumstantial, the
57Id.5
s Rex 'v. Reners, sufpra, footnote 37 at p. 240 (Alta. S.C.): "... a picketing
effected.., to constitute a menace and practical compulsion by moral force
even if no physical force were contemplated. ." See also Quinn 'v. Leathem,
[1901] A.C. 495 at p. 541: "There are many ways short of violence, or the
threat of it, of compelling persons to act in a way which they do not like.
There are annoyances of all sorts and degrees."
59 Reg. v. Donnelly and Brierly, supra, footnote 1.6 o0Supra, footnote 5 at p. 86. See also Besler v. Matthews et al., 71
C.C.C. 183; Reg. v. Donnelly and Brierly, supra, footnote 1; Aristocratic
Restaurants, supra, footnote 7.
61 Supra, footnote 26 at p. 329.
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criminal standard must nevertheless be met if a decision of guilt
is to be sustained.62
(c) Watching and besetting
If the Ward, Lock case is to be followed, the watching and
besetting or picketing, in order to constitute an offence under section
366(1) (f), must be shown to be wrongful and without lawful authori-
ty. Picketing is not a civil wrong per se, although it may constitute
a nuisance, a conspiracy, possibly an illegal threat, or libel.
63
In Rex v. Elford64 and the Donnelly and Brierly decision, 65 the
courts held that the picketing of private homes amounted to a
private nuisance. This is traceable to an article by Armour 66 in which
a private nuisance was described as "an act or omission which causes
inconvenience or damage to a private person." The difference be-
tween a private nuisance and a public nuisance is that in order
to prove the latter the task is more onerous, requiring proof of
special damage.67 Whether such a distinction exists in theory is
highly conjectural,68 however, it does enable the Crown to meet the
requirement of "wrongfulness" more easily where the watching and
besetting of a private residence is involved.
(d) The peaceful picketing clause
Subsection (2) of section 366 provides that a person who
attends at or near or approaches a dwelling house or place, for the
purposes only of obtaining or communicating information, does not
watch or beset for the purposes of the Act. Mr. Justice Locke, in
his dissenting judgment in the Aristocratic case was of the opinion
that picketing was not included in the proviso; rather, "attending"
implied not a continued but a temporary presence. 69 However, Rand,
J. in the same decision explained that: "There is nothing in the
statute placing a limit of time on 'attending'.70 Furthermore, that
'attending at or near or approaching to such house' for the purpose
mentioned is not to be taken as a form of watching or besetting,
then likewise it is outside of the penalized conduct and could not
62 Supra, footnote 21 at p. 898.
63 Finkelman, supra, footnote 5 at pp. 98-101.
64 87 C.C.C. 372.
65 Supra, footnote 1.
66 Supra, footnote 5 at pp. 78-81.
6 7 Rex v. Elford, supra, footnote 64 at p. 374. See also Beg. v. Donnelly
and Brierly, supra, footnote 1. See also Clerk and Lindsell on Torts (12th ed.
1961), at pp. 636-41.
68 See Bird v. O'Neal, [19601 A.C. 907 (P.C.) at p. 927.
69 Supra, footnote 7 at p. 778.
70 Id., at p. 789. "Attending at or near" the premises would not appear to
include entry onto the premises. See McCusker v. Smith, [1918] 2 Ir. R. 432
and Larkin v. Belfast Harbour Commissioners, [1908] 2 Ir. R. 214.
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be excepted from it."' Indeed, if the proviso is to establish a true
exception this is the only interpretation which is acceptable. Doubt
would be cast upon the conclusion that attending includes picketing
only if the proviso were shown to be a precautionary measure not
modifying watching and besetting, in subsection 366(1) (f).
In order to be excepted from subsection 366(1) by the proviso
the picketing must have been for the purpose of "obtaining or com-
municating information." The only information that could con-
ceivably be "obtained," would be knowledge of strikebreakers72
working for the struck employer. Information about the strike could
presumably only be "communicated" to people unaware of it; this
would exclude the employer and employees of the employer. The
information could only be "communicated" to prospective employees
of the "struck" employer and the public at large. The sole purpose
of this "communication of information" would be to solicit the sup-
port of independent parties in the economic struggle between the
employer and organized labour. 73
A literal interpretation of the Act would indicate that the
proviso was intended to permit the peaceful picketing of a house
or place of business in order to persuade people to support the
cause of the picketers. The Report of the Royal Commission which
sat to recommend the nature of the English Conspiracy and Pro-
tection of Property Act is of no assistance in interpreting the section
since the government Bills were introduced into the House of Com-
mons far in advance of receipt of the Report.74 In the debates on
the Bill in the House, the view was expressed that the words "peace-
ably to persuade," were not necessary in the "peaceful picketing"
clause after the word "information" since "it was clear that peaceful
persuading was not illegal and there could therefore be no object in
inserting the words in the Bill. ' 75 The debates in the Canadian
House of Commons are unrevealing.
However, nowhere in the numerous cases in which the section
has been discussed has doubt been cast upon the actual efficacy of the
711d., at p. 788. Compare Carrothers, The British Columbia Trade Unions
Act, 1959, (1960), 38 Can. Bar Rev. 295 at p. 302.
The Code does not permit watching and besetting; to the contrary the
proviso to section 501 (now s. 366) specifies that attending at or nearpremises to communicate information is not a watching and besetting.
The problem may basically be one of terminology, but it is a lingering
one.
This view would appear to require the qualification since it is only deemed
not to be a watching or besetting for the purposes of the Act.72 R egina v. Bauld, 13 Cox. C.C. 282.
73 Compare the view in Slesser and Henderson, Industrial Law at p. 15,
referring to the 1906 Act in England: "It is doubtful whether this includesinformation to persons not parties to the dispute, and there must In any
event be an intention proved actually to receive or communicate information."74 Howell, Labour Legislation, Labour Movements and Labour Leaders(1902), at p. 367.75 Hansard's Parliamentary Debates (1875), at p. 715. See also Webb,The History of Trade Unionism (2nd ed. 1920), at p. 291.
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proviso.76 The problem stems not from a scepticism as to the genuine
nature of the proviso but from an inability to outline the factual
situations in which it applies apparently because of the superficial
incompatibility of compulsion on the one hand and peacefully picket-
ing to communicate information on the other.77 This problem has
become more profound with the increased readiness on the part of the
Courts to find in social or moral coercion sufficient evidence of com-
pulsion. This anomaly is compounded in the following manner. In
order to convict under the section it is necessary to prove that the
accused person wrongfully and without lawful authority picketed the
premises of the complainant for the purpose of compelling him to do
or refrain from doing something. Before the accused is put into the
position of being able to take advantage of the proviso by showing
his purpose to have been the communication of information, the
purpose of compulsion has been proven against him. Thus, as
Magistrate Graham in the Donnelly and Brierly case suggested, where
the element of compulsion can be inferred from the surrounding
circumstances, the proviso will never operate. In the decision in
Williams v. Aristocratic Restaurants, Mr. Justice Rand said:
This may mean that the conduct envisaged by the proviso excludes
compulsion as the object in view. If it does, then with every respect for
this high authority, I am unable to follow it; unless the conduct within
the exception has that object it would not be within the first part of the
definition: it is assumed in determining a question under s-s (4) and
the proviso that there was an intention to act with a view to compel
by 'attending at or near .. in order ... to communicate information
... but there is a difference between watching and besetting for the
purpose of coercing either workmen or employer by presence, demeanor,
and unexpressed, sinister suggestiveness, felt rather than perceived in
a vague or ill-defined fear or apprehension, on the one side; and attend-
ing to communicate information for the purpose of persuasion by the
force of a rational appeal, on the other.7 8 [Italics added.]
76 Regina v. Bauld, supra, footnote 71; Lyons v. Wilkins, supra, footnote
25; Ward, Lock, supra, footnote 26; Midland Superior Express Limited v.
General Truck Drivers and Helpers Union, Local 31 (1956), 19 W.W.R. 618;
Rex v. Doherty and Stewart, supra, footnote 12; Besler v. Matthews et al.,
supra, footnote 60; Canada Dairies Ltd. v. Seggie, supra, footnote 51; Hertig
v. Reiss et al., 68 C.C.C. 334; Shane v. Lupovich, 78 C.C.C. 272.
In Rex v. Carruthers, 86 C.C.C. 247 (Ont. Co.C.), the first reported case
interpreting the proviso after its addition in 1934, the following was said at
pp. 24849.
They also have a right to attend at, or near, or approaching to their
employer's place of business (commonly called a picket line) to obtain
or communicate information. . ... I can see nothing wrong with a
member of a picket line using peaceful persuasion or an employee
about to enter his employer's premises to work, but if force is used, or,
if any threat or threatening gesture is made, or if access to the premises
is blocked by a member, such act is wrongful and without lawful
authority, and a besetting or watching within the meaning and intent
of s.501(f) [now Section 366(1) (f)].
77 Royal Commission on Trade Disputes and Trade Combinations [cd. 2852),
1906 at p. 157; see also questions 1730, 2354, 2356; see also Ford, A Breviate
of Parliamentary Papers, 1900-1916, The Foundation of the Welfare State
(1957), at p. 200.78 Supra, footnote 7 at pp. 788-89. The proviso is thought to permit
"peaceful" persuasion [supra, footnote 75] yet persuasion may constitute
compulsion" for the purposes of the Act [supra, footnote 57].
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He stated further that communication is not limited to a rational
appeal.
If 'persuading' means to influence by the force of rational appeal, then
the interpretation given the proviso, if it is to be applied in all cases
without exception, seems to me to be unwarrantably restrictive;
certainly it would appear to be so where the appeal is to the public .... 79
This line of argument is strengthened by the fact that regardless of
the result of the case, the complainant still has recourse to his civil
remedies.80 It is submitted that the adoption of any other line of
reasoning is to permit the Courts to legislate in lieu of the Canadian
Parliament and involves a judicial repeal of section 366(2) of the
Criminal Code.
To conclude that the communication of information may involve
a certain amount of compulsion does not in itself provide a solution to
the problem of the application of the section to any given factual
situation. The question which arises is at what point does the purpose
of obtaining or communicating information become the purpose of
compulsion and thus preclude the accused from seeking shelter under
the proviso. This is simply a matter of what weight is to be given to
the evidence adduced; it is a matter of degree and of the application
of the "best evidence" rule. In performing such a function, the
Courts would be performing their proper historical and legal function
and not infringing upon the duties of Parliament.
(e) Dwelling house or place
On a literal reading of the proviso, a "dwelling house" and any
other "place" are given unequivocal and synonymous treatment. In
the Donnelly and Brierly decision Magistrate Graham appears to
dilute the proviso where the peaceful picketing of a private residence
is involved. He comments:
the picketing was done in such a manner as to inform the neigh-
bours of the complaint in a public manner what his [the complainant's]
private views were on a particular subject. I feel that the line must be
drawn somewhere and as far as picketing is concerned that line should
be drawn where it interferes with an individual's privacy, the privacy
to live peacefully in his home.81
To differentiate between a private residence and another place is
certainly to violate the intention of the draftsman.
It would appear that Magistrate Graham in the Donnelly case
concentrated primarily upon the nature or type of the coercion. He
stated:
The person whose home was picketed was a person who resided and
lived in that home and did not carry on his business in that home and,
as such, the interference was directed not as to his mode of carrying
on business but as to his individual enjoyment of his place to reside.82
79 Id., at p. 789.
80 Id.
81 leg. v. Donnelly and Brierly, supra, footnote 1.
82 Id.
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The nature of the coercion, be it social, moral or economic, should
not be the determining factor, rather a Court should be concerned with
the degree of coercion when deciding between the purpose of com-
pulsion or communication of information.
In the Donnelly case there were but two picketers; there was no
altercation or noise, simply an exhibition of signs. This would appear
to be a case in which the purpose of communication of information
clearly outweighed the purpose of compulsion and would therefore
permit the peaceful picketing proviso to operate.
CONCLUSION
As a result of numerous statutory transformations the policy
underlying section 366 of the Criminal Code has become obscure.
The decisions on this branch of the law are in a serious state of
disarray.8 3 Unfortunately the words of the Act contribute to this
confusion by reason of their vagueness and lack of lucid definition.
An authoritative pronouncement by the Supreme Court of Canada
would constitute a major step in stabilizing this portion of the law of
labour relations but a more decisive contribution could be made to the
whole field of labour relations if the Parliament of Canada were to
revisit this section of the law in the light of its more recent social
context 8 4 The picketing of private homes may flout our social
sensitivities but an outraged social sensibility does not justify the
application of any section of the Criminal Code in other than its
literal and grammatical sense.8 5
83 Tremeear's Criminal Code (5th ed. 1944), at p. 579.
84 Tritschler, Report of the Brandon Packers Strike Commission, January
1961, at p. 87 did not recommend any amendment.
85 At least one State Legislature, Hawaii, has specifically legislated
against the picketing of private residences. With regard to threats to watch
and beset see Eames, Industrial Disputes and the CriminaZ Law, [19601 Crin.
L. Rev. (Eng.) 232 at p. 241.
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